Pierre de Coubertin has become known as the founder of the Olympic Movement and restorer of the modern Olympic Games. He was born on 1st January in Paris and passed away on 2nd September in Geneva. Pierre de Coubertin can be regarded as a progressive-mined educator, who believed in and promoted the power of sport as a tool for character development and transnational understanding. He never tired of developing initiatives in this field that went beyond the governance of the Olympic Games and the organization of Olympic congresses. It was in Lausanne, the Olympic capital, that the initiative was taken to create an international committee to preserve, analyse and disseminate the works and thoughts of Pierre de Coubertin.
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Meeting at the Olympic Center in Warsaw. The political manoeuvre, however, was quite transparent, and the F. The whole incident was politically imprudent and, on the whole, embarrassing. This anecdote may demonstrate that it is not necessarily the Court scraping up as much power as possible, but that rather the political system itself deliberately shifts decisionmaking power to Karlsruhe. Christine Landfried , Bundesverfassungsgericht und Gesetzgeber, supra note 11, at 47 et seq.
Even elections may cause too much disturbance of elite cartel procedure. This demonstrates the inherent dangers of consociationalism. For deeper insights into consociational democracy see, for example, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. For an extension of the consociational model to intergovernmentalism, see J.
Weiler, Ulrich R. For a psychological evaluation of accountability see P. Four illustrations: 1 Fundamental attribution error. Whereas people tended to see events as caused by the intentions and dispositions of individuals rather than by situational factors, this tendency has been reduced by making them personally accountable for their judgments. Individuals form judgments on the basis of early information and are slow in revising those judgments even if there is disconfirming evidence to the contrary. Accountability reduces this effect.
Individuals tend to have greater confidence in the correctness of their own judgments than is warranted. Accountability reduces this. Individuals who are held accountable pay more attention to factors irrelevant to the decision than individuals who are not held accountable. However, the dilution effect may lead, e.
Four illustrations: 1 Favoring status quo. Individuals are more likely to choose an alternative if it is framed as maintaining the status quo -- being accountable increases this inclination. Individuals prefer alternatives with clearly anticipated consequences -- accountability accentuates this. Individuals tend to adopt positions that are acceptable to others -- this is accentuated in the case of accountability. Individuals weigh possible gains from successful cooperation against potential losses from unsuccessful cooperation.
To be held accountable focuses on the latter. All four examples are neither positive nor negative in itself. They explain, though, why political decision-makers appear to favor status quo over change. This means that it reduces flexibility with respect to reconsidering choices once made and leads to focus on gathering information in support of the decision. Two illustrations: 1 Rationalization and self-confirmation. Individuals organize their experience and justifications to confirm the correctness of their decision.
They claim responsibility for positive and deny responsibility for a negative outcome. If they have to acknowledge the latter, they deny the negative implications of the outcome. Individuals increase commitment to once generated justifications. Again, both is not inherently bad, but is has to be taken into consideration. This is a likely concept in a world where human choices and actions are viewed as being decisive to the course of history -- accountability for historical outcomes. An idea attached to the conception of proper processes rather than results. March and Olsen compare this to parental tales about Santa Claus: Assertions of accountability are a kind of mythology that allows acknowledgement of the faith.
Niklas Luhmann would soberly call it a strategy to reduce complexity. The pervasive presence of unenlightened citizens, perverted accounts, and misinformed public opinion are old observations. They encourage a portrayal of the process of justification as distorted, betrayed, or deformed, thus undermining confidence in democracy.
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It is at this point that proponents of the revised story heavily borrow from the conventional story. Law is seen as expertise, expertise as knowledge, and knowledge as innocent and in the service of immaculate truth. Let us assume that the conventional story really believes in the myth of immaculate truth -- the revised story certainly does not.
Law, expertise, knowledge, and, eventually, truth perform the function of instilling the revised discourse with legitimacy, and -- down to earth -- attach more weight to one's own political opinion. The division of labor between expertise and politics breaks down -- a case of "innocence lost". March and Olsen argue that it may well be possible for experts to give naively 'unpolitical' advise.
But they enter a game of political manoeuver, with other players being extremely suspicious and adroit. The consequences are two-fold: experts start to see themselves as "someone who has influence over policy", and, since they are regarded as such, trust in them as expert individuals as well as trust in the institution of expertise is undermined.
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The implications: "Policy makers seek competence among experts, but competence alone is unlikely to be enough. Expertise needs to be reliable, not in the sense of being indistinguishable from advocacy, but in the sense of having a distribution of values and styles among competent experts that encourages a pairing of competent spcialists with policy amkers who trust them. Richard D. Harvard University Press Especially when Hindenburg was elected in the presidential elections, with a slight majority.
Hindenburg was a legendary, glorified although militarily defeated and politically poorly educated imperial field marshal. Moreover, he was filled with disdain for republican and civilian politics. In addition, see Arts.
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I follow the historian Karl Dietrich Bracher who accuses all of these explanations of one-sidedness and advocates a differenciated picture. Goebbels held his Sportpalast speech, which was broadcasted and since then has served as somewhat of an epitome of German fanatism for fascism and at the same time of the power of the national-socialists' seduction, in front of a selected crowd, i.
However, I do not claim that the whole German People was profoundly anti-democratic or totalitarian or national-socialist; my point is that the post-war drafters of the Basic Law a political elite mainly made up of members of the Resistance or emigrated democrats must have had this image of the German people. Events like the Sportpalast meeting doubtlessly have left their traces.
Krause, supra note , at para.
March and Olsen view this characteristic as one of three primary concerns of democratic construction of identities. The first is an instrumental concern, dealing with a democracy as a set of procedures for making collective decisions. The second is the mentioned moral concern, and the third is a transformative concern, conceiving of democracy as an arena for self-reflection and re-definition of individuals, institutions, and communities.
I am not so sure about her claims. First, it seems to me that in the United States, too, the necessity of balancing rights is common ground, and that Justice Black's absolutist theory is surely not on the edge of modern constitutional theory but for a different reading of Black see, e. Second, I am not convinced that the difference between the United States on the one hand, and Europe on the other hand, are as great as Glendon suggests e. This becomes most evident in her clearly biased and purified reading of the first abortion decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 39, 1 ; pp.
I believe, on the contrary, that rights talk on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean is in fact comparable. It is not so much the notion -- or more precisely: the illusion -- of absoluteness that distinguishes the declaration of a right from the declaration of some path of policy to follow; it is more the fact that a right is characterized by its inherent subjectivity, its being attributable, and sometimes even its unalienability.
After all, in the present context of my line of argument, it hardly makes a difference whether or not right are conceived as being absolute.
What is necessary and sufficient here is that the mere rhetoric of rights, as of course introduced by the Basic Law and as reinforced and developed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has made it almost impossible to add a critical footnote with regard to the extent of judicial review through the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition, the rights talk is practically a one-way-street: once fundamental rights are acknowledged and attributed, they become quasi irreversible. Who would be so bold as to take away constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights from the citizens?
The only realistically conceivable way is to narrow the scope of a right by cautiously emphasizing its limitations; but this is a complicated, sensitive and, above all, long story. This is a subject which today is no less sensitive than it was during the fifties and sixties. These exceptions were C. Schmitt, R. Huber, and O. Others who had been supportive of Nazism took up their job after some time, such as F.
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Berber, H. Feine, E. Forsthoff, H. Gerber, W. Hamel, J. Heckel, H. Helfritz, H. Herrfahrdt, K. Hugelmann, H.
Ipsen, F. Jerusalem, A. Maunz, E. Menzel, U. Scheuner, W. Schoenborn, C. Ule, and others. Apelt, G. Jellinek, R. Laun, R. Thoma, H. Triepel, E. Friesenhahn, H. Peters, R. Only the last three remained in office for a considerable time, the others retired relatively soon. See Michael Stolleis, ibid. Donald P.
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Kommers, Judicial Politics in West Germany. Am I alone in my sensibility that it is, to say the least, peculiar that a non-German lawyer digs up these things? Surely, the American academic environment and its orientation to realism provided more incentives than the subjectless German law discourse to analyse the biographical background of judges, professors, and justices. However, can we not be led to believe that at least part of it is the academia's reluctance to deal with its own past?
Quoted after Rinken, vor Art. This, of course, is only the official story. Schmitt had been a brilliant intellectual with a spell-binding writing-style; even after the war, many of his former pupils and even politicians visited him at his house in the Sauerland to ask for his advice. Many justified their personal ties with Schmitt through arguments such as "What he did was one thing; what he thought and wrote another. This line of argument, of course, does not hold. Professor Weiler clearly establishes the nexus between thought and deed and points to Schmitt's writings as preparing for 'ethnic cleansing': J.
To be sure, Professor Balkin is clearly critical of progressivism of Sunsteinian or Meiklejohnian kind. I might add that this public sphere has nothing to do with Habermas' public sphere e. Exclusion from the political process means more than just subjection to constitutional court decisions. The vacuum left through the forced vanishing of the people has been filled by political parties, another factor besides the Bundesverfassungsgericht that contributes to an ossified political process and, eventually, to the malaise many Germans feel about their political and party system.
The decisive impetus for the change in emerged directly from the People itself, and the citizens were so energised, eager, and engaged that a new dimension of democratic participation seemed in reach. However, after a short time, popular passion had been sucked into the West German party system, depriving active citizens of power, only to later disillusion them more and more. The technical procedure of the unification may serve as a symbol for the whole process.
From the very beginning, it started by weakening the People. Conradi, Member of Parliament, formulated in front of the Bundestag on September 20, "But the German unification, unfortunately, has not become the hour of Parliament, but of the executive branch. It is not a good omen that the German unification, having started with the words 'We are the People! Mahrenholz, Justice at the Bundesverfassungsgericht, hints at the role of the political parties, calls Germany a state in which interference of the people is prohibited, except for elections of the Bundestag ibid.
The unification process and the way the grassroot-democratic impetus was handled is described in a study with the telling title "The Round-Table, or, Where remained the People? The unification process has never generated any convocation or constituent assembly, and not even has there been careful and extended deliberation in Parliament. The reason for this is that the documents containing the details of the unification were presented to the Bundestag as international treaties after negotiations, leaving only a 'yes' or 'no' vote for the representatives similar to the US-American fast track procedure.
See, inter alia, Peter E. The Bundesverfassungsgericht gave its placet to this procedure. New search for: Tuplin, C. Steiner, , Stuttgart:; New search for: F.
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