It is not an exact science, but I guess this is the best advice I can give. The most important constraint is having effective local champions that advocate for the approach. So far, knowledge on how to implement a PBF scheme has largely been disseminated through the mobility of experts, with a massive involvement of experts from Africa — something remarkable if we compare with previous practices. Still the support from implementing agencies from the North has remained important. Which evolution do you expect in the close future? Any role to be played by the toolkit? I expect Southern experts to play even more important roles in the future.
Already, the most effective local champions are those who move from their own contexts to other contexts. Quite a few are very effective experts. Also, this toolkit is not a final product, but rather a look back in time, up to plus or minus the current period, and say: this is what has been done, this is how it was done, and this is what seemed to work better and this is what was tried and did not work well.
In this sense, this toolkit is a benchmark: experts will need to get acquainted with its content, and then move on and build on the knowledge contained in it and produce a next version. Northern technical assistants will have to adapt to these changing realities: they will have to devise business models that will focus on creating local capacity and be flexible and nimble.
How does the toolkit deal with this risk? I will give an example. The issue in my opinion is a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge on the contexts where these PBF approaches have evolved so successfully. A challenge obviously is that the knowledge on PBF is evolving very quickly. Another area is the increasing interest in moving towards process elements of quality, such as for instance the use of criterion based medical audits or vignettes case-studies. Furthermore, the issue of urban PBF, where public funds are used to contract private for profit providers through PBF will be a major growth area.
Also, the area of equity, of how we target the poor, is evolving really fast. In the World Bank we now work systematically hand in hand with our social protection colleagues, and there is a fair amount of cross-fertilization here. In the foreword, Tim Evans reminds us that delivering services is important to push the frontier of knowledge forward.
Some people think that when the World Bank adopts a new idea, trickle-down effects swiftly follow. Should we interpret this important document as the sign that the World Bank gets serious about implementation issues? I cannot speak for the World Bank, but I agree that there is a general wave inside the Bank to become much more focused on the poor and to become more effective and efficient in what we do for the poor.
This toolkit does just that. And it is set to become even bigger in Africa, while it is slowly taking off in Central and South-East Asia, and trickling into the Arab world and Latin America too. Do you have any plan in this respect? The way it was done, will enable adding tools to on-line folders in the appropriate chapters which will remain accessible through the links in the e-book, and through the WB website.
In the near future I believe that various chapters will need updating and this can be done in various ways. Isidore Sieleunou a eu un entretien avec le premier auteur. Le changement climatique modifie la nature de la relation entre les pays. Ce n'est pas facile, en raison de la concurrence fiscale entre les pays: les pays veulent garder une assez faible imposition pour attirer les investissements. Ou est-ce l'inverse? Oui, cela se produira. Mais je ne sais pas quand. Je suis devenu assez pessimiste sur le calendrier, mais je reste confiant que cela se produira.
Il n'ya pas d'avenir pour l'isolationnisme. The Forum is designed as a platform bringing together key policy makers and heads of laboratories, financial institutions and all industries in the health sector. What is the analysis underlying the organization of this conference? Africa is undergoing profound changes, all of which have an impact on human capital development and on how various stakeholders from the public and private sectors consider investment in the health sector.
Demography in Africa is characterized by a young and fast-growing population; this offers very dynamic growth prospects, provided there is judicious investment in human capital and a full leveraging of skills. The private sector is more than ever present. On the technology side, the continent is experiencing the technological curve, with spectacular advances in information and communication technology. By , mobile telephony network coverage will be almost universal. Politically, democracy is gaining ground in Africa, and governance standards continue to improve, thanks to the growing demand for citizen participation and accountability, which has encouraged democratic reforms and reduced conflict and civil wars.
Aware of these changes, we believe that traditional investment in health is not an appropriate response. The challenges are different. The actors have changed. The technological means available have also changed. Healthcare supply and demand has evolved. Based on these facts, we conceived the Africa Health Forum as the first public-private forum on health economics in Africa. The Forum will acknowledge recent developments on the continent and give to the private sector a place equivalent to that of the public sector and foster interaction between the two. The Forum will highlight four main themes, in tune with the major changes the continent is undergoing, to guide investment in health: employment, governance, new technology and financing.
Could you kindly illustrate what this new health investment model would mean, for instance, for an organization such as AfDB? I think the multisector approach is a better option, because the continent's challenges go beyond the traditional health investment framework. In addition, the private and public sectors need to better develop their synergies for more efficient investments in the health sector.
Based on your experience on the current dynamics in Africa, what do you see as the promising innovative solutions to enhance the development of the health sector in Africa? African States and all public and private actors must mobilize to carry on the progress achieved but a new paradigm shift is needed to promote the development of the health sector. African states should mobilize more domestic resources to invest in health, and the current environment is favourable. The continent is indeed experiencing a remarkable growth rate making it possible to invest more national resources while putting in place policies that enhance equity and social justice.
The fiscal space prospects linked with the exploitation of natural resources are also promising. It is also noteworthy that States which have made progress in terms of good governance, accountability and transparency in the use of resources for health are those with the best results in mortality reduction. African States should also intensify efforts to optimize the use of resources invested in health in sync with the Tunis Declaration of July on Value for Money, Sustainability and Accountability in the Health Sector.
They must create stronger incentives for evidence-based resource allocation and for activities with a high impact on health. How is this different from what was already attempted in the past?
In the past, African countries relied heavily on foreign aid to finance health; balance of power must now be readjusted through the use of innovative financing mechanisms. Aid is on the decline due to the global financial crisis and donors' new priorities. The resulting financing gap must be bridged at the national level and States must use innovative ways to raise additional funds. For instance, several African countries are analysing sustainable financing options for HIV and malaria, and their implementation mechanisms. This includes in particular Malaria Bonds , deductions from banking and airline ticket transactions, taxes on alcohol or cigarettes.
But fascists started to destroy the other races, considered to be un-human. The communists, in our experience, almost destroyed millions of our population, considering them to be bourgeois or not revolutionary. Liberals destroy the enemies of the liberal Open Society by bombing Libya, destroying Iraq, and so on. Everyone who is against the Open Society should be eliminated, destroyed, killed. That is nothing new, maybe something simply more or less human, but we should clearly understand what unipolarity and Western hegemony mean.
They might be friendly, but they are hiding a knife. We should be aware of this in the very least. Here we can see a soft version of unipolarity. But what goes on in other parts of the world? Bloody chaos, civil wars, radical political and religious extremist forces, killings — as has already happened in North Africa. The same fate is destined for Russia in the writings of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who said that Russia should be Balkanized.
But that is the idea of what will go on outside of these zones — a kind of manipulated chaos. There are three ways for China to deal with hegemony. It could accept Western hegemony, which is not so strange, I think. If we do not care about Chinese identity, maybe accepting Western hegemony is the solution, or at least an option. If every Chinese accepts this global society, with some skills and talents allowed for the Chinese people, maybe there will be some solution, but there will be no Chinese identity.
I do not think that there are too many of them, but theoretically this could be so, because hegemony is not only the strategic domination of the West, it is also values and standards. So a liberal, pro-Western, pro-Popper, pro-Soros trend could be identified in Chinese society.
Rediscovering the Pacific : a critique of French geopolitical analysis - Persée
I presume that there could be some educational structures, professors, and trends in cultures — maybe not dominating, because you have the Communist Party, the main guard of Chinese identity and the present Logos, and tradition. Nevertheless you have taken in a little poison, and poison can be active in some cases. You can affirm and develop Chinese regional hegemony. That is the realist, nationalist trend.
You could call this the badao , with wangdao adding an ethical dimension. That will be your Chinese way. But I think that this is the best way for China to consider hegemony. You could say that your hegemony is more or less in some area, maybe in some ways outside of Chinese borders and including other spaces, but you could also make differences — in one situation, political, in another economic, in a third hegemony could be cultural.
Hegemony is not bad in itself. But the most important thing is to have a just model for hegemony. For that balance and harmony, Chinese culture has many experiences. Balance is a part of Chinese identity. Chinese hegemony could be based on your own character and identity, not on some universal rules of hegemony. Lastly, you could try to put Chinese hegemony on a world scale, to propose a Chinese globalism. I have heard a kind of fear or idea among serious people in the US, the West, and Russia of the myth of Chinese globalization.
Maybe you have no idea or project to impose hegemony on a world scale, but others think that you have such plans. You need to accept them, because if someone thinks that there is something, that means that on the social level there is something, maybe only in their minds, but that is how the world is shaped — by projections of our thoughts.
You should not say that you have no such [hegemonic] idea. There are many people in different cultures who are absolutely sure that you have such ideas. You need to take that into consideration. If you know that there are such people, you will speak to them more carefully.
You should somehow promote your version taking into consideration how they regard China. The theory of the multipolar world, mostly developed by us in Russia, by the Eurasianist school and Russian school of geopolitics, means acceptance of differences between civilizations. Civilization is the main actor in IR, not the state. The difference here is of huge importance. This is not only because it is at the first stage of development, but because it contradicts any kind of globalist, Western understanding.
What is civilization? Civilization is a relative absolute, or an aspect of the absolute. I would like to stress this. What does it meant to be an aspect of the absolute? It means to be absolutely absolute — but not alone. If you are fully, totally Chinese, you could understand something or someone who is not Chinese only if you have fulfilled this absolute dimension of identity.
Then, from the center, not the outside, you can understand the Other.
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We cannot understand the Other if we do not understand ourselves. If we are not ourselves, we cannot deal properly with the Other. Then we would be only half Chinese, half Russian, half English, or half German. Only in the depth, core of this identity, can they understand others. All problems are not in this deep realization of identity, but come when we start to pretend that we have already realized this identity, when we are only halfway along the path. People who enter a new religion are more radical and fanatic than people living in that religion for all their life.
Nationalism, racism, xenophobia, the hatred of the Other, are possible only on the middle-path towards oneself. When we have fully realized our identity, our self, we are much more open to the other, because we consider, for example, that it is not only Russia that is absolute, but that by being more and more Russian, by discovering more and more the profound Russian identity, we are arriving towards the Absolute. Here, at that central point, we can meet the real, perfect, absolute Chinese. The Absolute Chinese meets Absolute Russian in the center of their civilization. By realizing relative aspects of the absolute, we are coming to the meeting-point of civilizations — not outside, not being totally destroyed as a cultural unity and fragmented into individuals.
The individual is like a robot, as a robot is a man without tradition or identity, a simulacrum of man. Civilizations should be understood in the plural. There are Chinese, Russian, European, Islamic, African, Latin American, Western civilizations that can interact, peacefully coexist, try to exchange their identities. For example, to become Russian, you can come to Russia, learn our language, accept our values, if you want or you do not have to. This concept of civilization is therefore inclusive. But we cannot propose a single unique civilization for all of humanity.
Maybe it will be the result of the Absolute, when everyone will go to the center of themselves, and we will arrive at the meeting-point of unique civilizations, but in order to do so we must make the long path within ourselves. That is the main meaning of the multipolar world. These are the formal concepts for understanding what a pole in the multipolar world theory is. So, what could be the Chinese version of the multipolar world? If you stress sovereignty too much, you can lose identity, and if you stress only cultural identity, you could lose the practical capacity to defend your sovereignty.
China should unite identity and sovereignty, and that is precisely what modern China is doing and what Xi Jinping wants to do. That is Greater China, the Chinese Dream. China is a civilization, which must be affirmed. There is the danger that if you forget this, you will be treated as population, masses, and individuals.
But you should educationally promote your civilization as such. You should call it a civilization. China is a regional hegemony in South Asia and the Far East — and beyond, as long as your power, will, and capacity let you expand your hegemony. But such should be linked to your understanding of what is justice, what is balance. If you expand too much, you can overstretch your hegemony.
Hegemony should be put in just limits. That was precisely our case. We should expand only within the limit in which we can assimilate, rule, manage, as well as develop our relations with the people who join us — we should always give them something, not humiliate them. I think that is important in dealing with Xinjiang and Tibet now. You should have them under your control, but you should understand them as the Other and include them somehow. That demands always updating and adjusting. The growth of this Tianxia should be in harmony. The importance is to start with China within your possible capacities to introduce this inclusive concept based on relations, justice, ethics, and hegemony.
China should be recognized as a pole in all senses. There you have already the basic aspects of a Chinese version of multipolar world theory. Here on this map we see the basic civilizations which could sooner or later be the poles of the multipolar world. Some of them are already present, such as the West, or European civilization if it will be affirmed as independent outside of globalist American hegemony, and there are the Eurasian, Chinese, and Islamic worlds — the latter of which is trying to affirm its identity, up to now not so successfully — and Africa.
It is interesting that in South America multipolar thinking is very developed There are many theorists there, many partisans of multipolar world theory and South or Latin American identity. Chinese International Relations theory can be based on multipolarity. Tianxia theory applied on an original scale could create this constant pole. The theory of moral realism of Yan Xuetong could be as well applied not only to China as a country, but Chinese civilization, and here his idea of ethics plus power acquires its implicit meaning. There are also analogues of the British school, with the relativization of Western rules for the club in which China is supposed to impose rules in the club that China would like to be a member of.
In the present situation, the G7 is a Western club which imposes rules that are alien to Chinese culture. If China is on the side of Land Power, then the world order is already multipolar. We are not so far from multipolarity. If China chooses multipolarity, this is not necessarily an alliance with Russia. China could be Heartland herself, as Europe could be a continental Heartland as in classical geopolitics, and there is of course the Russian Heartland.
These three heartlands could cooperate and create multipolarity very soon. This is an invitation to other civilizations as well. And so, to end, the geopolitical axiom of the 21st century is: Who controls China, controls Rimland; who controls Rimland, controls Heartland; who controls Heartland, rules the World.
We, Russia, cannot change our position in geopolitical space. We can exist as Eurasia, as Heartland, or we could not exist. We have no choice. It is difficult for Europe to make a choice in the present situation with the present elites. The only great power that in the present situation can make a choice, and has enough power to do so, is China. China has the choice as Rimland. Heartland cannot.
America cannot, although it is trying to get out of this globalization and Sea Power with Trump — not Trump himself, but his words and the votes for him — the American people tried to get out of this globalist concept, to reaffirm themselves as an American pole, not global. That is a very good sign. But now it is really only China that can make the choice. There are three solutions or choices for China.
That means that the West will rule Rimland, Heartland, and the World. If the globalists manage to promote their control over China through globalization, through influence on the young generation, technology, global capitalism, and liberal theories, they could rule the world. In the old version of geopolitics, China could be controlled by Russia Heartland. This is absolutely impossible today. It was not so impossible in Tsarist times, or including in Soviet times, when Stalin tried to help Mao and Russia influenced China.
But today there is no way, will, desire, possibility, or resources to do so. We cannot control China. China is so huge and developed that this is out of the question. Our weakness is therefore a very good thing for multipolarity. If you logically, rationally no longer fear Russia, you are free to accept us not as a threat, but as an ally, not as asymmetrical as before. The Turks have understood this.
It would be great if China would learn this lesson. Finally, China could be controlled by China herself. If the choice will be made in favor of China, that will mean multipolarity. On the one hand, there is the West that proposes its own system of values, identity, and civilization, while on the other hand there is the Russian Heartland, which does not propose anything a-symmetric.
The content of this lecture is very dense. I am going to present a new approach to International Relations. I made the first lecture here on classical and post-positive theories of International Relations, and in the second lecture I presented the basic principles of Geopolitics. Now I will evoke and use these concepts of International Relations as well as Geopolitics in order to explain what unipolarity, multipolarity, and hegemony are.
Let us establish some relations. In order to understand what multipolarity and the Theory of the Multipolar World are, we need to understand what unipolarity is. Unipolarity is precisely what we have in concrete politics after the fall of the Soviet Union. Multipolarity is the concept or theory that challenges this unipolarity. There is a kind of opposition or confrontation between the unipolar and multipolar world visions.
Unipolarity is based on some theoretical principles — geopolitical, ideological, and economic — and the same will be the case for multipolarity. But unipolarity exists, whereas multipolarity does not exist yet — it is in transition, but not yet achieved. We are in a transition from unipolarity towards multipolarity. We know what unipolarity is, but we do not know what multipolarity will be. This is an open, very passionate question. It is a little bit of a futurological perspective. There are many theories from International Relations. One of the most famous theories is that of the bipolar world system proposed by Kenneth Waltz, with the division into capitalist and socialist camp, or West and East, which, according to Waltz, represented a kind of balance.
In this system, one pole limits the other, they can cooperate, and their dialogue, confrontation, and opposition creates this system. The Third World was possible because of bipolarity and a kind of space between the two. But when the Soviet Union collapsed, the new idea of unipolarity was promoted by some realists in International Relations, first of all Robert Gilpin.
Robert Gilpin won his theoretical debates with Kenneth Waltz, because Waltz supposed that bipolarity would last forever in some way, because it was a more conservative, stable world system. Gilpin proposed the possibility of a unipolar situation. Unipolarity gained ground in theoretical debates in International Relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Krauthammer was not sure if this would last forever, or if it would end in time.
He was not sure if it was a world order or some temporary situation. The Rest should follow the West — that was the essence of unipolarity. There is only pole, one system, a global system — that is globalization. So unipolarity was the understanding, in realist terms, of the same concept as globalization, the End of History, or the unipolar moment. Russia at that moment was in a very low situation with Yeltsin, and was on the verge of collapse after the Soviet Union. But Putin began to reaffirm Russia as a sovereign country.
This was a kind of challenge to the unipolar system. For example, in Putin made his Munich speech which challenged precisely unipolarity and Western hegemony. In , we reunified with Crimea, and then we intervened in Syria. This means that there was something moving against unipolarity. Yet unipolarity still prevails in the global analysis. Unipolarity is ending, but the unipolar moment is lasting, it is still here. It is absolutely clear to everybody that something is wrong with unipolarity, that unipolarity is unstable and in decline, but it is still here, and no other political or international system has arisen.
We are living in the end of unipolarity. Unipolarity includes different aspects. They declare that the Liberal word should rule the world, and that Liberal countries should prevail and openly dominate everybody else. America should rule the world, and give the example and install the norms for other countries and cultures. So let us speak about the Western, post-modern, global, liberal, capitalist, neo-colonial empire in all of these senses. This is open, explicit unipolarity as it is presented in IR debates.
We will see American military bases all around, except in China and Russia. That is a concrete manifestation of unipolarity. The Pentagon vision is still absolutely unipolar. American national interests and American security are considered by the Pentagon to be a universal value. In their vision, it is your duty, for all of you and us, to defend American interests. Any man, movement, or country who does not agree with this Pentagon vision is an enemy. That is open unipolarity. That is one of the expressions of unipolarity.
NATO is a unipolar organization which tries to control the world for the benefit of only one pole. That is explicit, manifested unipolarity. And when this happens, there will be no great differences between the United States, Russia, China, or Africa. Everybody will become Americans, Western, and everybody must like liberal democracy and human rights. This is a special kind of globalism. It is not a dialogue between countries, cultures, and civilizations.
For example, Russia has proposed Russian values, and China has proposed a Chinese identity. But there should not be any collective identity in this concept of globalization. Everybody should be equal precisely because everyone should only be statistical individuals — no cultures, no religions, no ethnic roots.
Every man is already a citizen. That is pure unipolarity in a special, hidden sense. Multilateralism is the geopolitical application of globalism. Multilateralism is precisely giving to others the responsibility to rule the world with the United States as proxies, as vassals of the US. There are different countries that want to do this because they will have some special preferences within the global world-system. Strategic unipolarity includes Atlanticism, Sea Power in geopolitical terms, and full spectrum dominance doctrine, which affirms that in order to dominate the world totally, the West should not only use hard power or military power, but also soft power, culture, technology, network services, networks, and social services, that should control other societies from the inside, not only from the outside.
That is the idea of full spectrum dominance — domination of the air, the cosmos, space, sea, land, and inside human brains. That is a project of controlling human behavior, psychology, being, and human minds, by coding them through different methodologies. Here is the geopolitical vision of unipolarity with the United States in the center.
This is also the classical geopolitical map of how Sea Power should control Land Power. The idea is to fight for Rimland, which is the zone between Land Power and Sea Power, the coastal zone. This is the classical vision which is still the main basic map of the Pentagon.
The Pentagon understands the world more or less with this map. China belongs to the coastal area, to Rimland, so it is considered to be neither a radical enemy, nor a friend, but a zone to control. In multilateralism, there is the main power, the global hegemon, and two main satellites — Europe and China. Europe is inscribed and embedded in the latent structure, and for China the globalists have proposed the G2 project. Hillary Clinton came to Beijing in order to propose this to the Chinese government. That is more or less the idea of how the world will be if unipolarity and multilateralism prevail.
And they have started this bloody chaos in North Africa, promoting cultural revolutions, supporting all kinds of terrorist groups in order to have reasons to intervene. By creating chaos in this region, unipolarity conserves its power. Russia has the same destiny. There are two parties in the United States and global government — the explicit unipolar and implicit unipolar. These are the pigeons and the hawks. Ideological unipolarity entails the universalism of Western values and Human Rights ideology with the concept of human vs.
The concept of human in Human Rights theory is against the nation-state and against the concept of citizen. If you say that the human being has the same rights as the citizen, you destroy citizenship. Migration and the defense of migrants are not purely humanitarian, but ideological. It is the idea to destroy the concept of citizenship, nationality, and the state. That is one of the main goals of the so-called human rights movement. It is purely ideological — as much ideological as Marxism or National Socialism. It is pure propaganda, nothing humanitarian. If you share human rights values, you are globalists on one side, sharing an ideology just like racism in National Socialism or communism and the proletarian position in classical Marxism.
Human rights is a liberal ideology. It is not neutral. It is not self-evident. It is purely ideology, just as belongingness to the Aryan race or the capitalist or proletarian classes is. If you are in favor of human rights, you are already totally controlled by ideology. The deconstruction of the nation-state is the main goal of Liberalism in IR. Globalization is the technological and economic process, and globalism is the ideology of the unification of humanity under a world government.
They are different, but are not in contradiction. By promoting the same technology and economy, at the same time you are preparing the ground for political integration — from globalization to globalism there is one step. They are two levels of the same process. You could promote the theory that we need global government in order to avoid war and the destruction of the humanity, or you can put it into practice without expecting that everyone will accept it. So globalism and globalization are two different things, but are converging forces. Liberalism in International Relations is the theoretical basis for this ideological unipolarity, as it is itself an ideology.
The idea of world government is not an obsession of conspiracy theorists. It is part of the classical manuals of International Relations. If you carefully read any and all of the manuals on IR, you will discover that Liberalism in International Relations affirms that there should be a world government, a supranational system that will replace states in the future and progress in order to secure world peace. This is not a conspiracy theory — it is purely a theoretical term from IR as an established discipline.
Hegemony has different meanings. First of all, there is the strategic dimension. If we use the term hegemony in its singular form, with one hegemon or one empire, then we are speaking about unipolarity. In the singular, hegemony represents the concept of a dominating pole — that is the Western pole. Relative hegemony is an interesting concept of Mearschmeier, an American specialist in International Relations, who tries to impart a kind of relative approach to hegemony.
According to Mearschmeier, there is no clear or abstract law as to whether we should have one or many hegemonies. It is an open question: let us consider hegemony as an existing phenomenon without predicting that there will be only one, two, three, or four. In the case of the globalist vision, hegemony acquires a purely ideological dimension.
It is not leadership in the military and strategic domination, but it is ideological and cultural, a domination of values and cultural patterns. Therefore, you are under hegemony, because you follow rules that are not established by you. The Neoconservative version is the same as unipolarity — the strategic, open, explicit hegemony of the American Empire.
He is against the globalist version, which he criticizes. His is not so much Neo-conservative, because he was criticized during his election campaign by Neocons very severely. Trump uses some concepts with no clear meaning. This is important, because it could serve as a kind of transition from hegemonic order to post-hegemonic order. The main question of hegemony is whether there is one hegemony or hegemonies. The same question is whether there is one civilization or civilizations in the plural.
If there is only Civilization, there can be but one ideology, but if there are civilizations, there are completely different, even opposite ideologies and world visions. Whether we recognize the multitude of civilizations and hegemonies, or if you consider only one hegemony or empire, one letter divides two world visions. In the Western mind, there is an implicit hierarchy dealing with different kinds of societies — either in the historical way, or in International Relations.
There is a hierarchy in International Relations in a cultural sense as well. All types of societies are clearly divided by the West into three categories: Civilization, which is the West, Barbarity, which is the East, and Savagery, which is the South. Before the end of the Second World War, before racist National Socialism, the West used the metaphors of skin [color] in order to explain this hierarchy. For example, there is the technologically developed West with Human Rights, liberalism, individualism, and social security.
This is a kind of law that cannot be challenged. Even without biological racism, we have the same concept of racism in this distinction, because there is only one Civilization, only one example, only one norm — the West. If we consider this concept carefully, we can deconstruct all the discourses in International Relations on the West. The very idea of hegemonies and civilizations is based on the fact that there are many civilizations, not only the Western one. Other civilizations are neither barbarous nor savage, but merely of different types. It is one among different possible civilizations.
If we accept the fact of civilizations, then all of this system, the Western colonial system of hegemony and unipolarity, explodes immediately, because it loses ground in International Relations — there is the total decolonization of the world. There could not be any hierarchy between civilizations — all civilizations are equal, not in the sense of similar, but in that their differences cannot be put into an hierarchical taxonomy.
We need to accept them as existing not only in different spaces, but different times, ontologies, and anthropologies. We cannot judge one civilization by criteria taken from another. For example, in your case, the Chinese could think that some rites or rights in Christianity, liberal society, or in African tribes are disgusting or unacceptable.
You will treat them from the Chinese point of view. The same for them: they could find something completely unacceptable in your civilization or ours. We need to accept this diversity in a positive way. Let it be like it is. That means a total, absolute epistemological revolution against Western universalism.
And that demands de-colonization. Antonio Gramsci used the term hegemony in an ideological sense. How could a Marxist, supposed to be a materialist and explain everything in terms of economic relations, arrive at an ideological understanding of hegemony and capitalism as hegemony? Gramsci proposed a very interesting vision which is very important for the Chinese. Economics is at the base, while politics is on the top as, according to Marx, economics is essential for politics, which are only the expression of economics. But when Gramsci analyzed the Soviet experience and Leninism, he arrived at the conclusion that in the Russian Empire there was no proletarian class.
Our country, Russia, in the beginning of the 20th century, was not industrialized and there was no proletarian class. So a revolution from a Marxist point of view was impossible. Marx and Engels affirmed exactly the same thing for Russia and the East — before their full capitalization, including through their colonial experience, towards which Marx was very positive and even in favor of, because it brought capitalism into pre-capitalist societies and prepared the future proletarian revolution.
But what was Leninism? How was a proletarian revolution possible without a proletarian class? Gramsci explained by his theory that sometimes the will of a political group can go ahead of economic processes. In some situations, political will can replace the economic basis and transform the economy in order to satisfy all the conditions of Marxism — to create artificially a proletarian class out of peasants. Gramsci developed this idea to affirm that sometimes culture is more important than politics.
Geopolitics: Theories, Concepts, Schools, and Debates
You can be active in culture without being linked to a political, proletarian communist party and without any relation to politics or economics. You can create a kind of historical pact. Intellectuals can make a pact with capital and serve capital without being part of the bourgeois class. You can serve capital in your mind. Or, even being rich, prosperous, and a part of this bourgeois system, you can choose the working class and fight against capitalism. Thus, culture has the same autonomy from politics as politics has from economics.
That is maybe the case of China: you are using capitalism, but in order to promote your society and your ideals. Hegemony in Gramsci means that the West and global capitalism try to use not only economics and markets, and not only the political expression of such, democracy and parliamentarism, but also culture. Precisely those intellectuals who make the historical pact with capital are the worst. Hegemony is first and foremost a cultural phenomenon. This means that it is not a political ideology, but a kind of metaphysical decision. You can be in favor of capital as a system, as a metaphysical principle of the total liberation of the individual from any kind of collective identity, or you can choose fidelity to the working class, country, society, identity.
It is up to you. Nothing can oblige a human being to serve political or economic interests. The intellectual, who represents all of society, since everybody according to Gramsci is a little bit of an intellectual, represents the integrity of human society as professional thinkers. But an intellectual cannot think outside of the main metaphysical choice between capital and the working class. So, hegemony is first and foremost a metaphysical principle.
You could be on the side of hegemony while living in a socialist society, or being poor, or being a member of a Communist Party. To choose hegemony is an inner orientation. Hegemony penetrates society not only with political and economic structures, but in the mind and heart. It is a metaphysical virus. Hegemony is metaphysical liberalism, under which you work only in its favor. Now we finally arrive at multipolarity.
In order to clarify what multipolarity is, we need to establish some oppositions. Multipolarity is against unipolarity. Multipolarity is against globalism. Multipolarity is against multilateralism. Multipolarity is against hegemony in the singular. Multipolarity is against hegemony on three levels — first of all strategic, i. The last definition is that multipolarity is pluriversal — this is a concept introduced by Carl Schmitt.
In universalism, there is one unique concept of norms and values. How do we define a pole? A pole is a Big Space and a civilization. A pole is not only strategic or political; it is linked to a civilization as a culture or special type of society with special values. At the same time, it is not only a culture, but also a strategic space. Thus, in the concept of pole, we have both meanings: power and idea. The ideological and cultural levels and military force are inscribed into the pole in space, in political geography, and in cultural geography at the same time.
Here we can see a very approximate map of different big spaces that should or could be poles of the multipolar world order. Some of them are already poles — such as the United States of America. And there is, for example, the Indian big space: economically and demographically India has the possibility to become such a pole.
Latin America thinks in the same terms. The Islamic world tries, at least on the theoretical level, to become a pole as well. Africa is less developed and the Pacific big space are less developed. That is the map of the multipolar world order. I have already shown the maps of the globalists, the Pentagon, and CFR.
This is the Russian map of multipolarity. But what is important on the practical level is what we have now, or what we will have tomorrow, and that is a kind of aspiration towards multipolarity. We can see three poles accepted more or less in the multilateralist, globalist version — the American zone, the European zone, and the Chinese zone.
But as we have seen, the multilateralist approach is hidden unipolarity and thinks that there should be chaos everywhere outside of these three. The majority of Western experts and analysts are totally biased, because the science of International Relations itself is totally biased and Eurocentric.
Before being accepted into academic society, you have conclude your pact with capital. They try to use the Gramscian concept as well — they do not let persons who do not share their Western-centric vision. One Canadian-Jewish man, Michael Millerman, wrote a philosophical thesis on my ideas, and he was threatened with being thrown out of the academic field and Western universities because he treated my ideas in a neutral way, and not blatantly.
His was a more or less balanced or neutral philosophical analysis, but he was threatened by the academic society with being thrown out, because if you are on the Western side, you should only criticize and demonize the opponent — that is the normal rule. In mainstream political analysis, there is no recognition of the fourth pole of Eurasia — it is absent in all descriptions of future reality.
There are different versions on the fate of Europe, how China will be, whether it will become the main enemy of the United States, and there are many details that differ and different viewpoints that are accepted. With us as a pole, the meaning of China, the meaning of Europe, and the possibility for all other countries and civilizations to affirm themselves as independent poles, is gained.
That is a crucial point. Russia, once more in history, is in the right place at the right time. That is the key problem for multipolarity. But with the fourth pole, we have a completely different situation thanks to the existence of this fourth pole, which could not be universal, which could not be dominating through hegemony over China or Europe — we just cannot, we have no universal ideology or ideology at all in Russia. Our weakness could be used in our favor, because now we are in a position when we can save Russia by saving others — Europe and China — from Western domination.
Without this, we cannot be sure of our future. That is a purely pragmatic vision. With this fourth pole, we have real multipolarity, with the opportunity for the independence of Latin America, possible independence for the Islamic world, possible independence for the African world, and India — everybody acquires the chance to transform into a pole and defend their own civilization. This time, Russia proposes neither colonialism, as in Tsarist times, nor some ideology. We just want to defend ourselves as a civilization different from both Eastern and Western. In the concept of multipolarity, Russia is not a country or Western country, but an independent civilization that is partly Western, partly Eastern, but neither Eastern nor Western — a particular Russian civilization.
The acceptance of this fourth pole changes the whole picture.
Now we have multipolarity. Here we can see the difference between the multipolar and multilateral maps. They are completely different approaches. Now we are in a transition. We are at the bifurcation point, we can go either way. Nothing is granted. We are living in the end of unipolarity, but we have not yet created a multipolar world order. This process is open. We could be successful or unsuccessful.
We are here precisely in-between. This state of things is more or less consciously understood by some academic groups in the world. Eurasianism is also being developed by our group as a political philosophy that insists that Russia is not a country, but a civilization and part of multipolarity. The Fourth Political Theory is another theory developed by us in Russia, along with French and Italian intellectual groups, that invites to overcome the classical Western political ideologies — Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism.
It is outside of them, because the Fourth Political Theory does not recognize the universalism of the modern West. For us, it is an invitation to provincialize the West, to show that it is one province of the world, not the center. There are many centers and provinces in multipolarity. The Fourth Political Theory is the political expression of multipolarity.
In China, Professor Zhao Tingyang, with his concept of Tianxia Tixi , has developed the concept of a special Chinese model that is not only pure domination by force of strength, badao , but as wangdao , by moral and ethical hegemony. The concept of wangdao describes not only China as a state, but also other countries that China influences not necessarily in a direct, hegemonic way as in badao. This is a very multipolar approach among Chinese scholars.
Yan Xuetong is a realist in International Relations, but his defense of Chinese identity can be regarded as part of multipolarity. It is a defense of Chinese identity. In Europe, there is the New Right school. The European New Right is anti-liberal and anti-capitalist, and also includes Traditionalists. Alain de Benoist is the main philosopher of this school. They have developed a multipolar vision in which Europe should be an independent pole — completely independent from the United States of America, and very friendly towards Russia.
They are promoting this in a theoretical way with the concept of Pluriversum, as they are followers of Carl Schmitt. They are a very influential and interesting group of thinkers. There is also Norberto Ceresole, who was a Left Peronist and very influential on Hugo Chavez, his main ideologue, and a partisan for the unification of the Latin American space.
What is interesting here is that there are theories of multipolarity dealing precisely with where the possible poles are. We can see this in Russia, trying to develop multipolarity and affirm herself as a pole, in China trying to be more and more independent from Western hegemony, in Europe, which is trying to challenge Atlanticism, unipolarity, and American domination, and in Latin America.
What is strange is that we lack an Islamic concept of a multipolar world. We have only a caricature in the Salafi version of the Caliphate that should be global, and that is impossible as well as theoretically unexplored. But an affirmation of Islamic identity and accepting of the realities of the world is lacking — I do not know why. My works have been translated into Turkish, Persian, and Arabic.
There is a huge interest, but I do not know any serious theoretical constructions defending an independence of Islamic civilization. Everyone in Islam is in favor of that, but I am speaking not of the mood in the Islamic world, but of theoretical constructions. The same is the case in India. India pretends to be a very powerful hegemon in South Asia, but there are no texts — it is a very profound, metaphysically developed civilization, but it does not show any signs of a theoretical multipolarity.
So, the theory of the multipolar world, the multipolar approach, challenges Eurocentrism, Modernity, Universalism, and Hegemony. It is based on the presumption of a multitude of civilizations and refuses a hierarchy of them. The multipolar approach is based on anthropological pluralism, a positive evaluation of diversity and a new reading of the concept of Other. The West lacks a third definition of the Other.
Globalists say the Other is exactly the same as ourselves, while racists, colonialists, and nationalists say that they are better [than the Other]. Nowhere here is there the Other, because both are completely obsessed with themselves in a hyper-egoistic attitude. They put the Other only as the worst or the same, but where is the Other? The meaning of the Other is lost. The theory of the multipolar world is an anti-Eurocentric project for the re-provoncialization of Europe, a return to the pre-Columbian vision.
If we regard the pre-Columbian vision, we immediately discover that there was a perfect world order from a civilizational point of view, with no colonialism or Western domination. Everybody was in the perfect place from a civilizational point of view, but Western Modernity imposed colonialism and hegemony on the planet. The separation between America and Europe that is part of the multipolar world is itself a kind of return to the pre-Columbian time. Now, in the present day, in Syria, the ancient empires have reemerged — we see Iran on the rise, Turkey on the rise, and we can see Russia and China.
This is a sign of the return to the pre-Columbian world. The theory of the multipolar world is anti-modern because modernity is Western. We could say that we propose an alternative modernity or alter-modernity, but we do not agree that modernity is destiny. Modernity was a choice of part of Western society and civilization that led to catastrophe. Maybe it was the path of the historical destiny of the West, but it was not our destiny. Modernity is a Western concept. The theory of the multipolar world rejects the principles of the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment is optional.
He is the greatest author, the founder of the Traditionalist school with a radical critique of modernity and Western universalism. I also recommend Julius Evola. Finally, the theory of the multipolar world is counter-hegemony. The theory of the multipolar world regards the main actor not to be the state, but the civilization. Relations between civilizations are considered more or less in a realist perspective, but the difference between realism and multipolar world consists in the main aspect: the theory of the multipolar world deals with civilizations and Big Spaces, not states like in classical realism.
But it does affirm sovereignty. In the multipolar world theory, there is a shift from the sovereignty of the state to the sovereignty of the civilization, after which we can apply realism to the differences of subjects. A pole is a Big Space plus civilization. The geopolitics of multipolarity entails another shift in our understanding of geopolitics. Now Sea Power, in the geopolitics of multipolarity, is unipolarity, hegemony, and globalism, but Land Power is no longer only Heartland.
Land Power is all systems of poles except the United States. Everybody is Heartland in some symbolic sense.
Friday, April 22nd 2016, 3 pm-5 pm
This is not bipolar geopolitics, but a multipolar geopolitics that considers Land Power to be traditional civilizations. This is a very important change in the concept of Land Power in the multipolar version of geopolitics. Here we can see civilizations corresponding more or less to Big Spaces and strategic analysis. Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory are a part of this. Geopolitics is a separate branch of strategic analysis. There are some links between International Relations theories and geopolitical theories, but Geopolitics is an absolutely original and independent field of strategic thinking and analysis.
In this lecture, we are going to speak about the paradigms, concepts, schools, and main debates of geopolitics. Geopolitics can be defined as a discipline that studies the relations and interactions between Spaces Territories , States, Civilizations, Peoples, and Economics. This is a much broader context than that in International Relations, because theories of International Relations study only state-to-state relations.
Geopolitics is much broader. First of all, it is centered around the relations between the state and space territory — and not only, but also culture-to-culture and people-to-people, all put into space. Space in geopolitics plays the same role as time for history. Geopolitical analysis is based on the centrality of space.
Space, in any sense, not only the material, is synchronicity. It is something that happens simultaneously. It is a synchronistic, not diachronistic approach. It is a kind of political and human geography. Both terms were introduced in the 19th century by the German professor Friedrich Ratzel Political geography means the relation between the state and territory, or space.
The same Ratzel also used in his research the term anthropogeography, which means human geography. The anthropos , or man, is the most important here. In International Relations, nobody speaks about man or the human, but only the state. In Geopolitics, this is not so. Geopolitics tries to involve more levels of analysis than International Relations.
This is why there have been problems with this discipline, because some scholars think it is too broad and includes too many levels in one concept, and so is not a precise science. The next element in Geopolitics was the idea of the Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen He proposed the idea that the state is a living being. This was an organic attitude towards the state. If there are living beings that move, then states move, or they have certain relations to the earth.
This is an organicist concept. Kjellen and Ratzel belonged to the same philosophical school of organicism. They considered life, including political life, as something natural, not mechanical, but organic. So what is the space of Geopolitics? It is qualitative, not quantitative. Afterwards, the term was used to mean a space which a growing people needs to occupy in order to satisfy needs. But that was a practical, pragmatic use of the term. This is much more of Aristotelian space than the space of modern physics.
This is quantum-mechanical space, with different orientations. Space is different if you go to the North, South, East, or West — they are not relative concepts. There is a kind of absolute South or absolute North, absolute West, or absolute East. This space is a kind of category charged with proper characteristics. Space or territory is destiny. With such an attitude, space obtains a kind of historical meaning. Space is not indifferent; it is a very special, organic category. Space is also more important than time. This remark, as well, makes Geopolitics a post-modern discipline, because modernity is centered around time, history, and how everything is changing in the irreversible process of time and progress.
Geopolitics affirms that the most important category of human life and political relations is space. If you, your country, your culture, or your people, live in one kind of space, it will have special values, special politics, and special political organization — if, for example, you live on an island or in a coastal space, you will be obliged to have a different political system, cultural set of values, and so on.
Space, as the foundation of strategy, was also evaluated by the pragmatist and American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan These are the founding fathers or forerunners of Geopolitics. But properly speaking, Geopolitics as a discipline was formed later, in the beginning of the 20th century. The context of the birth of Geopolitics was British imperial strategy.
The real founder of Geopolitics was the British Sir Halford Mackinder, an English imperialist and partisan and promoter of reinforcing the British empire. He thought about the basic principles of the British imperial strategy, and tried to conceptualize them, basing himself on the political geography of Ratzel and the geostrategy of Mahan, and other authors — some British, some Americans.
The context is very important. Geopolitics as a discipline was born in the context of the British Empire in the beginning of the 20th century when the British Empire was still flourishing — not at the end or amidst decline, but at what might have been the peak of the British Empire, when the Britons ruled the world through the oceans, and had such colonies as India, China — which was almost a colony, not formally, but under Great British influence — Japan, Iran, the Middle East, Turkey, and almost all of Africa.
Whereas the German colonies there were very small, the French and Britain shared most of Africa. The British Empire was alive and flourishing. It is British imperial strategy, including the Great Game, that was the context of the birth of Geopolitics. The British Empire needed to control trade routes on the continent, but mostly throughout the oceans and seas, as the power of the British Empire was based on the control of trade routes.
That was the basic aspect of British strategy, the system of colonies, as Britain controlled and exploited many colonies in Africa, Asia, and so on. The idea, one of the main concerns of British imperialism, was to conserve the British Empire. Geopolitics was born as the theoretical reflection on Anglo-Saxon imperialism.
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